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Optimal Class Size, Opt-Out Rights,
and "Indivisible" Remedies
David Betson*
Jay Tidmarsh**
INTRODUCTION

The American Law Institute's ("ALI") Principles of the Law of
Aggregate Litigation ("Principles") have set a standard against which

the future analysis of class actions and other aggregation mechanisms
will be measured. Among the Principles' many accomplishments is
the creation of a vocabulary that both describes and stimulates analysis of major aggregation issues that the American civil justice system
faces. One of the most enduring and nettlesome of these issues is the
right of class members to opt out of a class action-an issue that is
caught up in the more general question of the optimal size of aggregation. The majority of class actions are opt-out class actions, in which
class members can leave the class, rather than mandatory class actions, in which class members cannot exclude themselves. 2 As a rule
of thumb, to which several important exceptions exist, class actions
that principally seek monetary relief are opt-out class actions, while
class actions that principally seek injunctive relief are mandatory.3
Associate Professor, College of Arts and Letters, University of Notre Dame.
Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. We thank the participants in the "Aggregate Litigation: Critical Perspectives" conference at The George Washington University Law
School for helpful comments on a draft of this Article.
1 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. (2010).
2 See THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CLASS
*

**

ACrIONS IN FOUR FEDERAL DISTRICr COURTS: FINAL REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

ON CIVIL RULES 21 (1996) (reporting data that sixty-one percent of class actions were opt-out
class actions and thirty-nine percent were mandatory class actions).
3 The first exception to this rule is the limited-fund class action brought under Rule
23(b)(1)(B) or equivalent state-law counterparts. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B). In limitedfund class actions, a court distributes proceeds from a fund insufficient to satisfy all class members. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 834-35 (1999). In dicta, the Supreme Court
has indicated that, under proper conditions, Rule 23(b)(1)(B) allows limited-fund class actions to
be maintained on a mandatory basis. Id. at 838-41. Second, some courts permit the award of
"incidental" monetary relief in mandatory class actions brought under Rule 23(b)(2). See FED.
R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). Compare Allison v. Citgo Petrol. Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 425-26 (5th Cir. 1998)
(restricting incidental relief to awards given on a classwide basis), with Robinson v. Metro-N.
Commuter R.R., 267 F.3d 147, 164 (2d Cir. 2001) (permitting more individualized monetary
relief), and Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 622 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (holding that
individualized backpay awards are available under Rule 23(b)(2), but remanding for a "comprehensive analysis" regarding whether an award of punitive damages would make monetary damFebruary 2011

Vol. 79 No. 2

542

2011]

OPTIMAL CLASS SIZE

543

The right to opt out has a constitutional basis of uncertain breadth,
but, at a minimum, seems to require an opt-out right for some class
members in many class actions that seek monetary relief.4
The distinction between mandatory (or injunctive) and opt-out
(or monetary) class actions has an historical explanation,5 but its theoretical foundation is weaker. Not surprisingly, therefore, the right to
opt out has received trenchant criticism 6 and has also engendered creages predominate), cert. granted, 79 U.S.L.W. 3128 (U.S. Dec. 6, 2010) (No. 10-277). Third,
courts sometimes allow parties to opt out of a mandatory class action. Compare Cnty. of Suffolk
v. Long Island Lighting Co., 907 F.2d 1295, 1304-05 (2d Cir. 1990) (permitting plaintiff to opt out
of a limited-fund class action), with Thomas v. Albright, 139 F.3d 227, 235 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that the district court abused its discretion in permitting plaintiffs to opt out).
4 See Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985) (holding that the Due Process
Clause requires that class members without minimum contacts with the forum state be given the
right to opt out of a state-court class action seeking damages); id. at 811 n.3 (limiting the holding
to "class actions which seek to bind known plaintiffs concerning judgments wholly or predominately for money damages"). The reach of Shutts has spawned much uncertainty. Among the
questions are its applicability in federal-court class actions, its applicability to limited-fund class
actions that involve monetary awards but are usually treated as mandatory under Rule
23(b)(1)(B) (or state-law equivalents), and its applicability to class actions under Rule 23(b)(2)
(or state-law equivalents), for which monetary relief is an "incidental" aspect of injunctive relief.
See Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 846-48 (raising in dicta the possible applicability of Shutts to mandatory
limited-fund class actions); JAY TIDMARSH & ROGER H. TRANGSRUD, MODERN COMPLEX LITIGATION 286-90, 419-24 (2d ed. 2010) (discussing ambiguities in Shutts).
5 Based on earlier antecedents, such as the bill of peace, the modern class action developed in equity as a mandatory device. As a general matter, equity had no authority to award
damages; hence, the ideas of "mandatoriness" and injunctive relief traveled together. The optout class action is a more recent device, built in 1966 on the foundation of the "spurious class
action," in which litigants seeking vindication of a "several" but "common" right could opt into
the class and (according to some courts) were also able to take subsequent advantage of a
favorable outcome in the case even if they did not opt in. Because "several" rights usually
involved claims for money, the ideas of opting out and monetary relief also traveled together.
On the history of the class action, see generally STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP
LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS AcTION (1987) (describing the emergence of the modern
class action from medieval roots); Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Bills of Peace with Multiple Parties,45
HARV. L. REV. 1297 (1932) (discussing the origins of bills of peace). On the development of the
more innovative opt-out class action from the concept of the spurious class action, see generally
7A CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1752-1753 (3d ed.
2005); Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 375-400 (1967). See also generally
Debra Lyn Bassett, Just Go Away: Representation, Due Process,and Preclusion in Class Actions,
2009 BYU L. REV. 1079 (providing a brief history of the precursors to Rule 23); David Marcus,
Flawed but Noble: Desegregation Litigation and Its Implicationsfor the Modern Class Action, 63
FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (discussing the history of the Rule 23(b)(2) class action).
6 See generally, e.g., David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual
Justice by Collective Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561 (1987) (arguing for class actions in mass tort cases);
David Rosenberg, Mandatory-LitigationClass Action: The Only Option for Mass Tort Cases, 115
HARV. L. REV. 831 (2002) (arguing for mandatory-litigation class actions and critiquing "put
option" class actions).
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ative lawyerly efforts to convert class actions principally seeking
money into mandatory ones.7 Even though empirical and anecdotal
evidence suggests that few class members opt out even when they
have the opportunity to do so"-and when they do opt out, their decisions are often strategic rather principled 9-finding a satisfying normative account of the opt-out right and its proper limits remains a
work in progress.10
The Principles provide a better foundation for distinguishing
mandatory from opt-out class actions. According to section 2.04(c),
the nature of the remedy determines the mandatory or opt-out nature
of a class action." But the Principlesdo not reduce the nature-of-theremedy inquiry to the simplistic historical distinction between injunctions and damages. Rather, they treat the remedial question functionally. If the remedy sought by the class representative is "indivisible,"
then an opt-out right is not required. 12 Conversely, if the class representative's remedy is "divisible," then class members enjoy an opt-out
7 Compare In re Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 172 F.R.D. 271, 284-86 (S.D. Ohio 1997)
(certifying a medical-monitoring class action under Rules 23(b)(1)(A) and (B)), and Day v.
NLO, Inc., 144 F.R.D. 330, 335-36 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (certifying a medical-monitoring class action under Rule 23(b)(2)), with In re St. Jude Med., Inc., 425 F.3d 1116, 1121-23 (8th Cir. 2005)
(reversing class certification of a medical-monitoring class action under Rule 23(b)(2)).
8 See WILLGING ET AL., supra note 2, at 52-53 (reporting that the median percentage of

opt-outs was 0.1% to 0.2% of the class membership and noting a few cases in which significant
numbers of plaintiffs opted out); see also JAY TIDMARSH, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MASS TORT SETTLEMENT CLASS ACrIoNs: FIVE CASE STUDIEs 10-11 (1998) (noting opt-out percentages of 2%

and 8% in two mass tort settlement class actions and further noting significant numbers of optouts in other mass tort settlement class actions, but failing to provide exact percentages due to
uncertainty about the size of the class membership).
9 Parties who opt out can sometimes extract larger payments than they could have from
remaining in the class action. See TIDMARSH, supra note 8, at 39 (reporting that the 259 plaintiffs

who opted out of a mass tort class action settlement received significantly more in subsequent
settlements than they would have in the class action); Reed R. Kathrein, Opt-Outs, MFNs and
Game Theory: Can the High Multiples Achieved by Opt-Outs in Recent Mega-Fraud Settlements
Continue, A Discussion Draft, in SECURITIES LITIGATION & ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTE 2007, at

583, 587-90 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. B-1620, 2007) (discussing numerous securities fraud cases in which opt-out institutional investors received settlement
awards that were numerous multiples larger than the settlement awards received by class
members).
10 For an important recent effort focusing especially on constructing settlements that reconcile the competing values of individual autonomy and global peace, see Richard A. Nagareda,
Autonomy, Peace,and Put Options in the Mass Tort Class Action, 115 HARV. L. REV. 747, 751 n.8
(2002). See also generally Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principleand the Structure of

the Class Action, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 149 (2003) (explaining the structural distinction between
mandatory and opt-out rights by means of a principle that sees the proper scope of class actions
to be the resolution of preexisting legal rights).
11

PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LmG. § 2.04(c) (2010); see also id. § 2.07(c).

12 Id. § 2.04(c). With somewhat greater specificity, section 2.07(c) then provides that class
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right.13 What becomes crucial, therefore, is the definition of "indivisible remedies." According to the Principles,"indivisible remedies" are
ones in which "the distribution of relief to any claimant as a practical
matter determines the application or availability of the same remedy
to other claimants."1 4
With one exception, this approach tracks existing law.15 The formulation is also an important step forward. In grounding the ability
(or inability) to opt out in the functional commonality of the remedy
that class members obtain, section 2.04 connects the opt-out right to
concerns for fairness, equality, and efficiency, rather than to ancient
jurisdictional boundaries in the English courts.
This Article takes up the ALI's invitation to consider opt-out
rights in terms of functionality, fairness, and efficiency, and provides a
normative economic account of when opt-out rights should be afforded. As we demonstrate, the ALI's approach does not always
track economic intuitions about when class members should be allowed to opt out of class actions. Part I specifies the assumptions on
which our analysis is based. Using standard economic tools, especially
marginal utility analysis, Part II describes how to determine the optimal size of a class action. In light of this analysis, Part III concludes
that opting out of an optimally sized class action should not be permitted. Finally, Part IV relates the conclusions from the prior two Parts
to critique the Principles' use of indivisible remedies as a test for
members should not be afforded an opt-out right when a mandatory class is necessary "to manage indivisible relief fairly and efficiently." Id. § 2.07(c).
13 Id. § 2.04 cmt. a ("'[D]ivisible remedies' are claims typically handled under Rule
23(b)(3).").
14 Id. § 2.04(b).
15 The Principles countenance mandatory limited-fund class actions on somewhat more
expansive terms than those permitted by the Court. Compare Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527
U.S. 815, 838-42 (1999) (presuming that mandatory class actions are only appropriate in limitedfund cases in which all plaintiffs proceed under the same legal theory), with PRINCIPLES OF THE
LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 2.04 cmt. a (2010) (allowing mandatory class actions in limitedfund cases even if some plaintiffs also claim additional damages that warrant individualized
treatment). At another point, however, the Reporters' Notes state that section 2.04 "is designed
to explicate with greater precision the approach taken in recent years by courts under the auspices of Rules 23(b)(1)(A) and (b)(2)." Id. § 2.04 reporters' notes. Because limited-fund class
actions are certified under Rule 23(b)(1)(B), not 23(b)(1)(A) or 23(b)(2), the Reporters' Notes
imply that section 2.04 was not intended to deal with any monetary claims, including limitedfund claims. The Reporters make no attempt to reconcile this statement with Comment a, which
had recognized that section 2.04 might be used to create mandatory class actions in limited-fund
cases. In another arguable change to existing law, the Principles permit the award of individualized (and variable) incidental monetary relief to class members in a mandatory class action seeking an injunction-an issue on which some courts have taken a more restrictive position. See
supra note 3; PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LrrlG. § 2.04 cmt. b, illus. 5 (2010).
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mandatory class treatment. We show that the "sameness," or the indivisibility, of the remedy does not correlate with the efficient use of
mandatory class actions.
In developing this normative account about the optimal size of
class aggregation and the circumstances in which class members
should enjoy a right to opt out, we focus only on "small-stakes" or
"negative value" cases-cases in which no class member has an incentive to bring a case on his or her own.16
I.

BACKGROUND ASSUMPTIONS

We begin by assuming that n individuals compose the group N,
which has been harmed by a single defendant. We further assume that
N is a group large enough to satisfy the numerosity requirement for
certifying a class action.17 The harm that each potential plaintiff suffers is equal to H,, where the subscript i refers to the ith individual.18
The following two Sections specify further assumptions that we
make. In the first Section, we assume that an individual can take only
one of two actions: sue the defendant individually or do nothing.19 Individuals cannot cooperate. In the second Section, our strategy is to
16 See infra text accompanying note 23. On the idea of "small-stakes" or "negative value"
suits, see generally Jonathon R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in
Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58
U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1991). See also Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997)
("A class action solves [the] problem [of lack of incentive due to small recoveries] by aggregating
the relatively paltry potential recoveries into something worth someone's (usually an attorney's)
labor." (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (1997))); Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 748 (5th Cir. 1996) ("The most compelling rationale for finding superiority in a class action-the existence of a negative value suit-is missing in this case."); In re
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, J.) ("In most class actions-and those the ones in which the rationale for the procedure is most compelling-individual suits are infeasible because the claim of each class member is tiny relative to the expense of
litigation.").
17 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1) (requiring, as a condition of class certification, that the class
be "so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable").
18 We could extend the modeling to account for the amount of care that the defendant
could have taken and consequently make the amount of harm a function of A, i.e., H;(A). For
now, however, we are not worrying about the question of the optimal amount of care.
19 There are alternatives, including permissively joining with other plaintiffs, see FED. R.
Civ. P. 20(a)(1), filing separately and consolidating with similarly situated plaintiffs, see 28
U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2006); FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a), and filing a competing class action; see Rhonda
Wasserman, Dueling Class Actions, 80 B.U. L. REV. 461 (2000) (discussing the problems associated with the filing of class actions where membership and claims overlap). We recognize the
importance of these alternatives in describing the "game" of how putative plaintiffs might be
expected to behave in response to one plaintiffs filing of a class action. For our present purposes of describing the contours of an allocatively efficient opt-out right, however, we do not
introduce this complication.
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show the potential gains to plaintiffs of cooperating and acting collectively through a class action and then to specify the characteristics of
the class action on which we base our subsequent analysis.
A.

Individual Actions-A Noncooperative Game

Let RI; equal the amount that the ith individual can recover
through an individual action. 20 If we assume risk neutrality, then RI
can be interpreted as the expected amount of i's recovery in an individual action. Next, let PI; represent the probability that i will prevail
in this action, and let EBI, represent i's expected gross benefit of an
individual action (i.e., EBI; = PI, x RI;). Next, let CIi represent the
expected cost of pursuing the case individually. Finally, let NBI; represent the expected net benefit of an individual action (i.e., EBI, CI;). Finally, we assume that i will choose to sue only if the expected
net benefit from the lawsuit is greater than zero. Thus, i will sue only
if EBI - CI > 0, or EBI > CI;. 2 Otherwise, the individual will do
nothing. 22
Next, we assume that for no individual i does the expected net
benefit of an individual action exceed zero-in other words, CI >
EBI for every individual i. This condition represents the classic negative-value situation that some courts have in recent years suggested is
particularly suited to class action treatment. 23 Given these assumptions, no individual will file suit.
Next, we assume that plaintiffs cannot coordinate their activities
or otherwise cooperate. Although a plaintiff who sues first might supply enough information to later plaintiffs to make it cost-effective for
them to sue, 24 the first plaintiff cannot recapture the costs of the first
20 In most cases, RI; will be equal to the harm that the individual suffered (H;), but, for
purposes of generality, we leave RI unspecified.
21 We can also represent this assumption with two equivalent formulations: (1) (PI, x RI;)
- Cl > 0, or (2) NB!I > 0.
22 We assume that the plaintiff cannot find a lawyer to handle the case on a contingency
basis. If the plaintiff can do so, a contingent-fee arrangement offloads some of the costs of an
unsuccessful action onto the lawyer-a result that can affect the decision whether to sue. Our
assumption that no lawyer will handle the case on a contingency seems warranted in most cases
because the lack of net benefit to the plaintiff limits the fee award to the lawyer. In any event,
finding such a lawyer does not affect the assumption that a plaintiff must obtain a net benefit i to
bring suit. It affects only the point at which the putative plaintiff is willing to sue.
23 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
24 For instance, if the first plaintiff prevailed, later plaintiffs might be able to use offensive
collateral estoppel and eliminate their costs of proving the defendant's liability. But see Parklane
Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331-32 (1979) (stating that a court can deny issue-preclusive
effect to a finding of liability when the plaintiffs in later cases could have joined the first case).
The elimination of that cost might be sufficient to make the later plaintiffs' lawsuits worthwhile.
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suit from these later-filing plaintiffs. 25 As a result, every plaintiff has
an incentive to wait for someone else to sue first. This noncooperative
game therefore has the following equilibrium: If no individual has a
positive expected net benefit from suing individually, no one will
sue. 2 6 Assuming that the plaintiffs' cases would have had a positive
net benefit if they could have coordinated by aggregating their claims,
the result is a prisoner's dilemma. 27
B.

Class Actions-A Cooperative Game

We now add assumptions that affect this initial equilibrium. Most
significantly, we assume that the law permits one member of N (the
"class representative")28 to create a class action of size G, where G is
less than or equal to N (G 5 N). We also assume that G, which could
be as large as N but could be smaller, is also of sufficient size to satisfy
the numerosity requirement 29 and that the class action also satisfies
the other prerequisites for class certification.30
Similarly, the costs of discovery in the subsequent cases might be substantially reduced because
of the work done in the first case. See United States v. AT&T, 461 F. Supp. 1314, 1342-43
(D.D.C. 1978) (ordering, over defendant's objection, that documents that plaintiffs in a prior
antitrust case had selected during discovery be produced to a plaintiff in a subsequent case).
25 Although it is possible for a court to require parties who benefit from the creation of a
common fund to share in the costs of creating that fund, see Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307
U.S. 161, 170 (1939), the "common fund" concept has never been extended so far as to require
later plaintiffs who sue independently to reimburse earlier plaintiffs whose cases eased their own
paths to recovery.
26 We can also show that, if one individual has a positive expected net benefit, then that
person will file and others may file later, depending upon the outcome of the first trial and the
costs that the first-filed case obviates. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text. If two or
more individuals have positive expected net benefits from suing individually, then no one will
file in the equilibrium condition. Because we are restricting ourselves only to the case in which
no one has an individual incentive to file, see supra text accompanying note 23, we do not consider these situations further in this Article.
27 Many games are not prisoner's dilemmas, and judges and legal scholars often overuse
(and misuse) the phrase when analyzing the behavioral consequences of legal rules in game
theory terms. See Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoners'Dilemma: Coordination, Game
Theory, and Law, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 209, 214-18 (2009). But this case is indeed a true prisoner's
dilemma; the equilibrium condition of doing nothing leaves all participants in the game (the
group of putative plaintiffs in N) worse off than an alternative (aggregation) that relies on the
cooperation of others. See id. at 215-16. Because that cooperation cannot be guaranteed, however, and because any individual who sought aggregation might end up even worse off (due to
the expense of unsuccessfully trying to aggregate) than if the person had done nothing, no party
has an incentive to switch his or her strategy from "do nothing" to "aggregate."
28 More than one person can serve as a class representative. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)
("One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties . . . ."). We
simplify and assume that a single member of the class can do so.
29 On the numerosity requirement, see supra note 17 and accompanying text.
30 Other requirements that the class representative and class counsel must satisfy are com-
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We now make certain critical, but realistic, assumptions about the
characteristics of this class action. First, we assume that the expected
gross benefit to the group increases (or at least never decreases) as the
size of the group increases.3 1 This condition reflects the fact that, as
more members are added to the group, either the collective harm that
recovery is based on increases or the probability that the defendant
will be found liable increases. 3 2
monality, typicality, adequacy of the class representative, and adequacy of the class counsel. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2)-(4), (g). The class representative must also meet the related due process requirement of adequate representation. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 43-45 (1940).
In prior work, one of us has suggested that a class representative meets the adequacy requirement as long as the expected net benefit to each class member (NBC;) equals or exceeds the
expected net benefit from individual action (NBAI) and the expected net benefit to each class
0). Jay Tidmarsh, Rethinking Adequacy of Representation, 87
member is at least zero (NBC
TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1176-77 (2009). These conditions ensure that the class action does not make
class members worse off than they would have been in choosing between filing an individual suit
or doing nothing. Because the equilibrium condition in negative value cases of the kind we are
considering is to do nothing, the class representative must, under this theory, ensure that each
class member receives an expected benefit of at least $0-in other words, must not be made
worse off by class treatment than by doing nothing. This very minimal condition might seem
evident, but it has not always been honored. See Kamilewicz v. Bank of Bos., 92 F.3d 506, 508,
512 (7th Cir. 1996) (refusing to overturn a state-court settlement of a negative value class action
in which one member of the class received $2.19 in benefits and was assessed a fee of $91.33 to
cover costs). This floor can be criticized as too minimal a description of adequacy. See Patrick
Woolley, CollateralAttack and the Role of Adequate Representation in Class Suits for Money
Damages, 58 KAN. L. REV. 917, 944-47 (2010). Although this floor is relevant to our analysis at
various points, see infra notes 50, 57, 63, 74, 78 and accompanying text, our analysis is not affected if a court imposes a stronger adequacy of representation requirement.
31 The expected gross benefit could decrease if members of the class are made worse off
by the class action's attempt to rectify the harm that the defendant caused. This is unlikely in
most cases, especially involving monetary claims, but the situation could arise if some class members were involved in the alleged impropriety and might suffer adverse consequences if the class
action's allegation were proven. In injunctive cases, it is easier to imagine situations in which all
class members might be harmed by the injunction that the class representative seeks. See, e.g.,
Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 37-38. Because the class representative could not adequately represent
harmed individuals, see supra note 30 and accompanying text, the class definition would need to
exclude them. See, e.g., Little Caesar Enters., Inc. v. Smith, 172 F.R.D. 236, 240-41 (E.D. Mich.
1997) (noting that a class definition in an antitrust case excluded, among others, the defendants,
the officers and directors of the principal defendant, and its subsidiaries). Once these individuals
are excluded, the condition described in the text necessarily holds.
32 In mathematical terms, an increasing gross benefit to group G can be expressed as
EB(G), where the first derivative with respect to G is positive and the second is negative.
Experimental data suggest that, as group size increases, the likelihood of the group's recovery increases, even if awards to some plaintiffs might decrease. See Irwin A. Horowitz & Kenneth S. Bordens, The Effects of Outlier Presence, Plaintiff PopulationSize, and Aggregation of
Plaintiffs on Simulated Civil Jury Decisions, 12 LAw & Hum. BEHAV. 209, 226 (1988); see also
Irwin A. Horowitz & Kenneth S. Bordens, The Consolidationof Plaintiffs: The Effects of Number of Plaintiffs on Jurors' Liability Decisions, Damage Awards, and Cognitive Processing of
Evidence, 85 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 909, 914, 917 (2000) (reporting data showing that the likelihood of recovery increases with the inclusion of more plaintiffs, but the average damage award
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Next, we make one of two assumptions about the marginal benefit of adding an additional class member. First, in some (albeit rare)
cases, the marginal benefit of adding an additional class member
never increases or decreases; each class member obtains precisely the
same expected gross benefit from the class action. These cases will
almost always involve monetary claims for violation of a statute that
sets mandatory minimum damages in excess of any class member's
actual loss. 33 We can graph expected gross benefits to the class as follows, with the line MB representing the marginal benefit from adding
each additional class member.
Figure 1. Equal-Benefit Case
Benefits

(in $)

MB1

N

Class Size

In most cases, however, Figure 1 is inapposite. Rather, the benefit of the expected remedy varies among members of the class. For
example, an injunction ordering desegregation of a school system has
greater benefits to those who are in kindergarten than those who are
seniors in high school. Likewise, the amount of compensation appropriate for securities fraud varies with the number of shares each class
member possesses. If we sort individuals by the harm they have suffered from the largest amount to the smallest, we can graph the exdecreases if more than four plaintiffs are aggregated). This result seems to confirm the common
sense intuition that, as the number of victims rises, factfinders are more likely to think that the
defendant did something wrong.
33 Cf Ratner v. Chem. Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (declining
to certify a class of 130,000 consumers that sought $13 million in $100-per-claim statutory damages, in part because using a class action would impose excessive liability).
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pected gross benefit as follows, where the line MB 2 represents the
marginal benefit from adding each additional class member. 34
Figure 2. Declining-Benefit Case
Benefits
(in $)

MB2
N

Class Size

Next, we make certain assumptions about costs. We first assume
that the total cost of litigation, represented by TC(G), increases as the
size of the group increases.35 Second, we assume that the marginal
cost of adding new class members is generally falling. This assumption
is contrary to the usual assumption that marginal costs rise, but, in
34 The area under the marginal benefit curve represents the total gross benefit of a group
of size G, EB(G).
35 In mathematical terms, the first derivative of TC(G), the marginal cost of an additional
group member, is positive everywhere. This assumption seems realistic in all cases involving
monetary relief delivered to individual class members; the costs of identifying the class member
and delivering a remedy to that member make costs rise when each new member is added to the
class. The same is also true for many cases seeking injunctive relief. For instance, an order to
establish a medical monitoring program requires the expenditure of money to identify class
members and determine their eligibility for the program. Put differently, if the remedy requires
individualization of relief to class members, total costs rise as the size of the class increases.
Some injunctions-notably public law injunctions that strike down legislation as unconstitutional-arguably do not meet this description; beyond a certain point, they impose no additional
costs as more members are brought into the class. Even in this situation, however, some class
members might subsequently attack the judgment in later cases. See, e.g., Hansberry, 311 U.S. at
32, 39-40 (permitting successors in interest to a property owner who was bound by a classwide
injunction to challenge the injunction's applicability to them); see also infra note 89 (discussing
collateral attacks). Spread across the class as an expected cost, the inclusion of more class members will increase costs slightly; as the size of the class increases, the chances for such collateral
attacks also increase. In any event, if total costs do not increase as the size of the class increases,
then the marginal cost of adding new class members is zero. Our subsequent analysis is therefore unaffected; in such cases, the optimal class size is N. See infra text accompanying Figures 4,
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general, it seems a reasonable assumption in the class action context.
A principal component of the cost of litigating the action is the cost of
the initial discovery, which is the same whether the case involves one
or N plaintiffs. Although costs might increase somewhat as the size of
the class increases-for instance, the defendant might feel the need to
conduct more discovery as its exposure to liability increases, 3 6 or the
inclusion of more class members might require the use of additional
methods to notify the class 37-economies of scale are likely to offset
these increases.
Third, we assume, more controversially, that the marginal cost
declines continuously from the first class member, who has the highest
expected gross benefit, to the last class member n, who has the lowest.38 Again, this assumption is generally reasonable; larger claims are
likely to involve larger costs, and, in particular, the class counsel and
defense lawyers will work harder to maximize or minimize, respectively, the value of the largest claims. Any discontinuities involving
rising marginal costs are most likely to happen in one of two places.
The first occurs with the first few additions to the class before the class
reaches a size that either meets the numerosity requirement or is economically viable to bring. Thereafter, marginal costs should fall as additional class members exhibit patterns comparable to the early
members of the group.39 The second occurs at the tail end of the class
36 Cf Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334, 346-47 (5th Cir. 1982) (refusing
to give issue-preclusive effect to a prior judgment involving only one asbestos plaintiff because
the defendants had a limited incentive to expend significant resources in the prior case).
37 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) (discussing when notices should or must be given to class
members in mandatory and opt-out class actions).
38 This assumption necessarily holds when every class member obtains the same benefit
from the class action. Because the marginal benefit for each class member is identical, we obtain
declining marginal costs simply by sorting individuals by their costs of litigation (from the largest
amount to the smallest). For reasons that we explain infra notes 47-48 and accompanying text, it
is better to sort class members in a different fashion in which marginal costs might start to rise as
the class size approaches N. But see infra note 59 (describing situations in which this sorting is
unavailable).
39 For instance, the plaintiff with the most highly valued claim might reside in Vermont.
The person with the next-greatest claim might live in Georgia, and the third might live in New
York. A principal cost of maintaining any class action is providing notice to class members. See
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 175-76 (1974) (requiring individual notice to every
reasonably identifiable class member in an opt-out class action). When the class members are
known, the cost of giving notice should remain fairly fixed for each new class member. When
the class includes members who are not readily identifiable, however, substitute notice in print
and broadcast media might become necessary. The costs of a substitute notice campaign in Vermont could be significant, but the inclusion of the second plaintiff and the cost of substitute
notice in the Georgia market increases the marginal cost of including the second class member.
The same is true of adding the third member from New York, At some point, a nationwide
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(i.e., the class members approaching n), where it becomes more and
more difficult to identify those who suffered increasingly modest
harms and where the costs of administering the remedy might increase
due to rising labor and other associated costs. 4 0 Our subsequent analysis relaxes the assumption of continuously falling marginal costs. 4 1
Finally, we assume that the class action is at some point economically viable (i.e., the expected gross benefits from a class action of size
X equal or exceed the total costs of a class action of that size). We can
express this condition as: EB(X) TC(X), X < N; or by means of
Figure 3, where X represents the number of class members whose inclusion in the class makes the class action viable. As Figure 3 depicts,
the costs of litigation for the highest-value plaintiff exceed the benefits
they would received from a successful suit, and, consequently, they
would not initiate an action. As more members of the class are
brought into the action, however, the costs of the action rise more
slowly than the total benefits of the remedy to the members of the
group. Eventually, at X members, the total benefits of the action exceed the total costs.

notice campaign to reach unidentified class members might become necessary. These media
campaigns can be very expensive. See TIDMARSH, supra note 8, at 55, 67-68 (describing costs of
$7 million and $22 million associated with nationwide notice in two mass tort settlement class
actions). As more members from a state are added as class members, however, these costs
should fall for the reasons described in the text.
40 For now, we assume that relief in the nature of cy pres is unavailable, and that each class
member must receive relief corresponding to the harm he or she suffered. See PRINCIPLES OF
THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LrrlG. § 3.07 (2010) (discussing the conditions under which cy pres
relief is appropriate); supra note 20 and accompanying text (declining to specify the relationship
between the harm suffered and the remedy awarded); see also infra note 53 and accompanying
text (discussing cy pres relief). We relax this assumption infra notes 53-56, 62 and accompanying
text.
41 See infra text accompanying Figures 5-6, 8-9, 11.

554

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:542

Figure 3. Class Size Where Total Benefits Equal Total Costs
Benefits J
and Costs \ MC
(in $)

MB2
X

N

Class Size

We do not specify the marginal cost (MC) line beyond x for reasons that we explain shortly. 42
Equipped with these assumptions, we can now determine the optimal size of a class action. Once we have done so, we can then analyze the circumstances under which an opt-out right is justified, as well
as the relationship between optimal class size and the Principles' concept of divisible remedies as the determinant of the right to opt out.
II.

THE OPTIMAL SIZE OF A CLASS ACTION

In analyzing the optimal size of a class action, we begin by examining the relationship between the marginal benefits and marginal
costs of different group sizes G.
Once we have created a group of size X, a class should continue
to add members as long as the benefit of adding another class member
exceeds the cost of doing so-in other words, as long as
MB(G) > MC(G). It should stop adding class members once the cost
of adding another class member exceeds the benefit from doing so-in
other words, when MB(G) < MC(G).43
42 we specify possible shapes of the marginal cost line infra Figures 7-11.
43 If marginal costs are always rising, then negative value class actions could never form.
Because no individual has an incentive to sue, the marginal costs of bringing a class action are
higher for the first class members than the marginal benefits of a class action. If marginal costs
rise from there, while marginal benefits remain steady or fall, costs would always exceed benefits, and the class action would never be viable. The fact that negative value class actions form is
an experiential confirmation of our assumption, see supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text,
that marginal costs generally fall as class size increases.
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Under the assumptions we have specified, the shape of the marginal benefit and marginal cost lines will usually result in one equilibrium point and, therefore, one optimal class size. In one case,
however, more than one equilibrium point exists, and determining the
optimal group size becomes more complicated.
A.

Identical-Benefit Class Actions

We start with the rare, but illustratively useful, situation in which
the value of the remedy is identical for each individual in the class.44
This situation yields a single equilibrium point-a single optimal
group size. Simplistically, it might be thought that this class size is N.
This idea is reflected in the position taken by the Principles,which do
not require an opt-out right when the remedy given to one class member in essence determines the remedy to be given to other class
members.45
The argument that N is the optimal size is straightforward. Because the marginal benefit of adding an additional class member is, by
definition, always the same, we can order the class members from the
member with the highest marginal costs to the member with the lowest. When the class adds member x, the total benefit of the class action equals its total cost.46 If this break-even point comes just as a
class of size n is formed (in other words, X < N), then N is the only
class that can be formed consistent with our assumptions. On the
other hand, if the break-even point arrives before the class reaches
size N (in other words, X < N), then adding class members x through n
is economically justified. At point X, marginal cost is less than marginal benefit, and the ordering of class members assures that the marginal cost will fall from x to n, while, by definition, the marginal benefit
remains constant (and larger). Because the marginal benefit of adding
each member x through n is greater than the cost of adding that member, the class benefits by adding these members until the class N is
formed. In mathematical terms, a class of size N is optimal because
MB; > MC, for x < i < n. Figure 4 graphs this result.

45

See supra Figure 1 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.

46

See supra Figure 3 and accompanying text.

44
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Figure 4. Optimal Class Size (N) in Equal-Benefit Case
Benefits
and Costs
(in $)
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X

N

Class Size

But this argument-that a class of size N is optimal in identicalbenefit cases-holds only in some circumstances. In other situations,
a smaller class is optimal. To explain, we must distinguish between
common costs (those costs whose expenditure benefits the group as a
whole) and individual costs (those costs whose expenditure benefits
only an individual class member). Roughly, common costs arise in the
process of determining the defendant's liability or resolving classwide
defenses (e.g., the costs of investigating the defendant's liability, disclosure and discovery costs, the costs of seeking class certification, the
costs of responding to motions to dismiss or for summary judgment,
and other costs involved in determining whether the class has a viable
claim). For the most part, common costs are invariant with the size of
the class. Therefore, marginal common costs are falling (perhaps even
reaching zero) as the class approaches size N. On the other hand,
individual costs are often associated with remedial issues (e.g., the
costs of determining each class member's entitlement to a remedy, the
costs of determining the amount of each member's remedy, the costs
of delivering that remedy to the individual class member, and the
costs of resolving plaintiff-specific defenses, such as contributory negligence, that affect both the entitlement to and the amount of the remedy). Many of these costs vary among individuals 47 and can rise as the
47 Sometimes costs might not vary. For instance, in the identical-remedy scenario, the cost
of determining the remedy, which by definition is the same for each class member, does not
change. Likewise, identical-remedy cases usually involve consumer fraud and other statutory
violations in which individual defenses are limited or nonexistent. Finally, in some consumer
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identification of class members and the administration of a remedy
become increasingly difficult due to informational problems.48
If we order class members from those with the lowest individual
costs to the highest, we find that marginal costs can rise as the group
approaches the maximum class size N. It is possible, although not inevitable, that the marginal cost of adding some class members-determined by combining the marginal common costs attributable to that
class member plus the marginal individual cost associated with that
class member-exceeds the marginal benefit that the class obtains
from adding that member. For instance, it might cost $500 to identify
a consumer entitled to a $100 remedy. The inclusion of class members
for whom the marginal cost of class membership exceeds the marginal
benefit of class membership is suboptimal; a smaller class size (call it
G,) that excludes these members is optimal.
Thus, we have three scenarios. In the first, marginal individual
costs never rise. This is the situation depicted in Figure 4, and the
optimal class size is N. In the second scenario, marginal individual
costs rise as the class size approaches N, but the marginal benefit of
adding class member n remains higher than the marginal cost. In this
scenario, the optimal class size is also N, as Figure 5 depicts, with the
line MC 2 representing the eventually rising marginal costs.

fraud cases, such as cases involving holders of credit cards issued by the defendant, the cost of
identifying the members of the class also might be constant across the class.
48 In addition, some literature suggests that, as a group's size increases, the incentive of
group members to cooperate decreases. See T. K. Ahn et al., Endogenous Group Formation,10
J. PuB. ECON. THEORY 171, 190-91 (2008); Dale 0. Stahl & Ernan Haruvy, Other-Regarding
Preferences:EgalitarianWarm Glow, Empathy, and Group Size, 61 J. Ecow. BEHAV. & ORG. 20,
33 (2006). It is not clear that this possibility has great salience in the class action context, given
that little active cooperation is expected of class members. See infra note 82 and accompanying
text. To the extent that it has salience, however, this possibility also adds another cost that
increases as the size of the class approaches N. We thank Beth Burch for calling our attention to
this literature.
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Figure 5. Optimal Class Size (N) in Equal-Benefit Case
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In the third scenario, marginal individual costs rise as the class
size approaches N, and eventually exceed marginal benefits once the
class reaches size G1. Figure 6 depicts this scenario, with the line MC 3
showing the rise in marginal costs.
Figure 6. Optimal Class Size (G,) in Equal-Benefit Case
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In this third scenario, because marginal costs continue to rise for
class members after g; through n, the marginal benefit of adding these
class members is less than the marginal cost of doing so; the class is
better off by excluding class members g; through n from the class.
Therefore, the optimal class size is G1. A class larger than G, leads to
lower net benefits than a class of size G1 , but so does a class smaller
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than G1, because the class could be made better off by adding members up to g1.49 In the scenario represented by Figure 6, the inclusion
of class members g; through x is not only inefficient, but, to the extent
that these members are assessed the full costs associated with their
claims, it also leaves them worse off than they would have been had
they not sued-a result that arguably renders the certification of a
class larger than G; constitutionally impermissible.50
Certifying the class G; carries one important disadvantage: the
defendant does not pay for some of the harm that it causes. Assuming
that the expected gross benefits for class members between g; and x
equal the harm caused,51 then the shaded area in Figure 6 represents
the amount of liability that the defendant avoids when G, is the optimal class size.
Failing to force the defendant to internalize all the harm it causes
is perhaps not a great concern in most identical-benefit cases, in which
the statutory damages can exceed class members' actual losses.52 To
the extent that full internalization is desirable, however, two methods
can address the issue. First, the court or class counsel can spread
some of the costs associated with the claims of class members g,
through x among the remaining class members, so that the cost for
each member from g; through x falls to or beneath the benefit that
member receives. This cost spreading allows a class of size N to be
formed, but it also yields a class with a lower net benefit than the class
G1 , making this approach suboptimal.
Second, a court can require the defendant to disgorge an amount
of money equivalent to the amount of harm caused to class members
g; through x, but not award the disgorged amount to those members.
Rather, the money can be put to another use that might be of indirect
benefit to class members. In other words, the court can award cy pres
relief.53 Cy pres, however, poses its own problems. With cy pres, the
marginal benefits for class members g, through x fall toward zero, but
49 Formally, a class of size G, is optimal when:
(1) EB(X) 2 TC(X), X < N;
(2) x < g, < n;
(3) MB, > MC, for x < i 5 gj; and
(4) MB; < MC; for g, < i <; n.
On the first term, see supra Figure 3 and accompanying text.
50 See supra note 30.
51 On this assumption, see supra note 20 and accompanying text.
52 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
53 The Principles' approach to cy pres relief is consistent with our analysis. It allows cy
pres relief to be awarded when providing relief to individuals is "not viable." PRINCIPLES OF THE
LAW OF AGGREGATE LrrG. § 3.07(c) (2010); see also id. § 3.07(a) (requiring that courts provide
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so do their marginal costs. 54 Although the amount of class members'
claims determines the amount of cy pres relief, the presence of class
members g; through x in the case is unnecessary.5 5 Hence, even with
cy pres relief, G, remains the optimal size for the class. Although the
analysis of optimal class size brings cy pres awards into proper focus,
whether to award cy pres relief is a policy question distinct from
achieving optimal aggregation.
B.

Declining-Marginal-BenefitClass Actions

We now move to the typical situation in which the benefit derived
from the class action varies among class members. In this scenario,
the analysis is, for the most part, the same as the analysis for the identical-benefit situation, but with an important twist: in some situations,
multiple equilibrium points can arise, making the choice of the optimal class size more complicated. We begin with cases in which there is
a single equilibrium point and, therefore, a readily identifiable optimal
class size. We then analyze the multiple-equilibrium condition.
1.

A Single Equilibrium Point

Figures 4, 5, and 6 considered three possible marginal cost scenarios-constantly falling marginal costs, rising marginal costs that never
exceed marginal benefits as the class approaches size N, and rising
marginal costs that exceed marginal benefits beyond class size G;-for
identical-benefit class actions. As we saw, N is the optimal group size
in the first two scenarios, and G, is the optimal group size in the last
individual relief when "individual class members can be identified through reasonable effort, and
the distributions are sufficiently large to make individual distributions economically viable").
54 For instance, in Democratic Central Committee of the District of Columbia v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission, 84 F.3d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1996), the plaintiffs alleged
overcharging of transit users during the 1960s. By the time that the case settled twenty-five years
later, it would have been impossible in some cases and cost-prohibitive in others to identify and
compensate the victims. The D.C. Circuit upheld the award of cy pres relief-in particular, the
purchase of new buses that benefited present transit users. See id. at 458. Transit users from the
1960s who were still riding buses in the 1990s therefore obtained some indirect benefit from the
cy pres award; other transit users from the 1960s (for instance, those who died or moved away)
received none. On the other hand, because costs associated with the creation and distribution of
the fund were charged against the cy pres fund and not charged to victims, see id. at 458-59, the
marginal costs to these victims was comparably low.
55 Including class members g, through x has the arguable advantage of binding them to the
class judgment or settlement. But, in a negative-value situation, their individual claims were
worth nothing to begin with; because they were never going to sue, this preclusive effect is, as a
practical matter, irrelevant. Moreover, if these class members are assessed the costs of bringing
their claims, the Constitution might prohibit a court from extending the preclusive effect of a
judgment or settlement to these members. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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scenario. In the context of falling marginal benefits, the same three
scenarios can also arise, albeit with one modification. Because marginal benefits are falling, marginal costs need not be rising for marginal
costs to exceed marginal benefits. Instead, as long as marginal benefits for class members x through n fall faster than marginal costs, it is
possible, although not inevitable, that at some point the marginal cost
of adding an additional class member will exceed the marginal benefit,
and a class size of less than N will be optimal.
With this modification, the results derived from Figures 4, 5, and
6 still obtain. The scenario equivalent to Figure 4, in which marginal
costs are below marginal benefits and are constantly falling, is shown
in Figure 7, with MC 4 representing the marginal costs of adding class
members. Here, for the reasons already described, the optimal group
size is N.
Figure 7. Optimal Class Size (N) in Declining-Benefit Case
Benefits
and Costs
(in $)
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X

N

Class Size

Next, the scenario equivalent to Figure 5, in which marginal costs
remain beneath marginal benefits but either flatten out or rise as the
size of the class approaches N, is shown in Figure 8, with MC5 representing the marginal costs of adding class members. Once again, the
optimal group size is N. Although the shape of the marginal cost lines
MC 4 and MC5 differ, the result in the two scenarios is the same.
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Figure 8. Optimal Class Size (N) in Declining-Benefit Case
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Finally, the scenario equivalent to Figure 6, in which marginal
costs eventually exceed marginal benefits for some class members, is
shown in Figure 9, with MC6 representing the marginal costs of adding
class members. Now the optimal size for the class is G2.
Figure 9. Optimal Class Size (G2) in Declining-Benefit Case
Benefits
and Costs

(in $)
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As with Figure 6, the shaded area represents the amount by
which the defendant avoids liability if the class G2 is formed. A
court's choices are either to allow the defendant to escape liability for
the harm caused to the class members between g2 and n, or to employ
some strategy to capture this value for the class (such as spreading
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excess costs from class members from g2 through n onto other class
members or awarding cy pres relief).56
To summarize, the optimal class size is N when marginal costs
remain beneath marginal benefits for class members x through n (the
scenarios in Figures 7 and 8).57 A smaller class (G2 ) is optimal when
marginal costs rise above marginal benefits for class members g2
through n (the scenario in Figure 9). *8 But these results obtain only
when marginal costs either remain below marginal benefits as more
class members beyond x are added, or when marginal costs exceed
marginal benefits at a single, unique point, g2 . 59 As the following Subsection describes, the latter condition does not always obtain.
2.

Multiple Equilibrium Points

Multiple equilibriums exist when there is more than one point at
which the marginal cost of adding an additional class member exceeds
the marginal benefit from doing so (i.e., MB(G) = MC(G)). To illustrate, consider Figure 10, with MC 7 representing the marginal cost of
adding additional class members.
56 See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
57 Formally, a class of size N is optimal when:
(1) EB(X) TC(X), X 5 N;
(2) MB, > MC; for x < i < n.

On the first term, see supra text following note 41.
58 Formally, a class of size G 2 is optimal when:
(1) EB(X) TC(X), X N;
(2) x < g2 < n;
(3) MB, > MC for x < is g2; and
(4) MB < MC; for g2 < i n.
On the first term, see supra text following note 41. This formula is equivalent to the formula for
determining the optimal group size in an identical-benefit situation. See supra note 49.
59 The analysis suggested by Figures 7-9 has other limits and should be interpreted with
care. Unlike the situation of a fixed remedy for each class member, see supra text following note
48, we cannot order class members from those with the lowest to the highest individual costs.
Although we have assumed that as a class member's expected benefit falls, the class member's
cost also falls, see supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text, the association between falling
marginal benefits and fatling marginal costs is neither inevitable nor continuous. It is not inevitable because, although common costs might remain constant or decline, individual costs associated with identifying and awarding relief to some class members can result in the marginal cost
for some class members exceeding the benefit that the class member obtains. See supra text
following Figure 4. The decline is not continuous because there are likely to be discontinuities
not reflected in Figures 7-9. For instance, the marginal cost might exceed the marginal benefit
on a $500 claim of a difficult-to-identify class member, but the marginal cost might not exceed
the marginal benefit on a $100 claim of an easy-to-identify class member. One response to this
latter difficulty is to remove such people from the class on the theory that they are inadequately
represented. See supra note 30. For further discussion, see infra notes 74-75 and accompanying
text.
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Figure 10. Multiple Equilibriums Where N Is Optimal Class Size
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Figure 10 shows two equilibriums: a class of size G3 and a class of
size N. G3 is an equilibrium because a class that has a number of
members between x and g3 can make itself better off by adding members up to g3 (the marginal benefit of doing so exceeds the marginal
cost (i.e., MB; > MC for x < i g3)), but it makes itself worse off if it
adds one more member than g3 (the marginal benefit of doing so is
less than the marginal cost (i.e., MB; < MC for g3 < i:5 g4)). But N is
also an equilibrium, for a class that reaches size G4 can make itself
better off by adding members from g4 through n (the marginal benefit
of doing so exceeds the marginal cost (i.e., MB, > MC, for g4 < i n)).
Rather than N, however, equilibriums can occur with classes of
size G3 and G5 when the marginal cost for adding class members from
g 5 through n is greater than the marginal benefit of doing so (i.e.,
MB; > MC for g4 P5 5 and MB; < MC; for gs < i n). With marginal
cost line MC 8 somewhat exaggerated to illustrate the point, Figure 11
shows the circumstance in which G3 and G5 (rather than G3 and N) are
equilibriums.
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Figure 11. Multiple Equilibriums Where Gs Is Optimal Class Size
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For the sake of simplicity, we assume that G3 and N (rather than
G3 and G5) represent the equilibrium points.60 It is an easy matter to
determine which one of these two equilibriums yields the optimal
group size: We compare the expected net benefits of a class with size
G3 to the expected net benefits of a class with size N. If the expected
net benefits of a class of size N are greater (i.e., EB(N) - TC(N)
> EB(G 3) - TC(G 3 )), then a class of size N is optimal. If the converse
is true, a class of size G3 is optimal. 61 If G3 is optimal, we again face
the problem that the defendant does not internalize the full costs of its
wrong (here, the losses suffered by plaintiffs g3 through x). The same
potential responses-ignore the harm or force internalization through
cy pres-also remain. 62
Figures 10 and 11 also point out a significant concern. For the
class members between g3 and g4, the costs of class treatment exceed
the benefits. If these members are assessed the cost of their inclusion
in the class, they end up worse off as a result of their class membership
than they would have been had they done nothing. This result is of no
concern if the optimal class size is G3 , but it is a significant stumbling
60 The analysis would be the same if G3 and G, were the equilibrium points, except that G.
would be substituted for N in the subsequent discussion.
61 In our analysis, we have focused on situations in which there are two equilibrium points.
It is also possible that marginal costs will fluctuate above and below marginal benefits for additional class members, creating a serpentine marginal cost line beyond g3. In such a case, there
are multiple equilibrium points (one at each point at which marginal benefits and costs are
equal). In terms of determining the optimal group size, the net benefits of all of the groups
would need to be considered.
62 See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
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block if the optimal size is G5 or N.6 3 It seems unfair to ask the class
members between g3 and g4 to "take one for the team." Moreover, if
the Constitution requires the class representative to not harm the interests of the represented class members, then the class representative
will be regarded as inadequate and the class will not be certified."'
Here, the only solution to hold the class together is to spread the
losses suffered by the class members between g3 and g4 among the
remaining class members, so that the members between g3 and g4 are
at least indifferent to class treatment, and might indeed be advantaged
by it. This type of loss spreading, which must be accomplished to hold
onto a class of optimal size, should be distinguished from the loss
spreading we discussed before, in which loss spreading was used to
create a class larger than the optimal size. 6
C. Summary

We can generalize our analysis as follows: a class action composed of all class members N is optimal when (1) the marginal benefit
of adding class member n exceeds the marginal cost of doing so and
(2) the expected net benefit of this class action exceeds the net benefit
of any other class action composed of fewer members than n. 66
When these conditions do not hold, the optimal class size is G*
(g* < n), where G* meets these conditions: (1) the marginal benefit of
adding another member beyond g* is less than the marginal cost of
doing so, and (2) the expected net benefit of the class G* exceeds the
net benefit of any other class action that could be constituted. 67
63 This analysis suggests how it is possible, even without bad faith or strategic behavior on
the part of the class counsel or the class representative, for some class members in a negativevalue case to end up worse off than they would have been had they done nothing. The poster
child for such a situation is Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston, 92 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 1996); see also
supra note 30 (discussing Kamilewicz). From one viewpoint, Kamilewicz represented a case in
which the rapacity of class counsel overbore the interests of the class members. See Susan P.
Koniak, How Like a Winter? The Plight of Absent Class Members Denied Adequate Representation, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1787, 1808-17 (2004). We do not intend to wade into that discussion. We note only that an alternate explanation is possible.
64 See supra note 30.
65 See supra text accompanying note 52.
66 Formally, the conditions are:
(1) EB(X)
TC(X), X N;
(2) MB, > MC; and
(3) EB(N) - TC(N) > EB(G) - TC(G) for any G_-mi 5 n. We
An equivalent, simpler formulation of the latter two conditions is MB; > MC; for x
adopt the lengthier formulation to correspond with the formula set forth infra note 67.
67 Formally, the conditions are:
(1) EB(X)
TC(X), X! N;
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Although generalizations are always dangerous, this analysis suggests that, as a general matter, class actions of size N (i.e., class actions
composed of the entire group of injured parties) are most likely to be
appropriate in cases that involve little to no individualized tailoring of
the remedy to members of the class. One example is a lawsuit seeking
to declare a statute or governmental practice unconstitutional, at least
when individualized remedial consequences are unlikely to follow
from the declaration. On the other side of the spectrum, an optimal
class size of less than N is more likely when significant issues in the
case are member-specific and heavily fact-laden (such as individualized defenses or the provision of individualized remedies to class
members whose membership in the class or entitlement to a remedy
are not readily ascertainable). In the absence of a significant number
of individualized issues, a presumption in favor of a class of size N
seems warranted. But this is only a rule of thumb; the inquiry into
optimal class size is fact-dependent.
As we end our discussion of optimal class size, one point bears
emphasis. Our analysis does not guarantee that a class of optimal size
will form. Assume that N is the optimal size for the class action depicted in Figure 10. If a class forms at size G3, the class members have
no incentive to form a class larger than G3 ; the class members will not
see their own benefits increase, and they run the risk of depressing
their own awards by adding lower-value claims. 68 Conversely, suppose that a class of size G3 is optimal. Class counsel, who can expect
that the fee award will be based on the total value of the award to the
class rather than on the award that yields the greatest net benefit, 69
has an incentive to seek certification of a class of size N rather than a
class of size G3 *
The best way to assure that classes of optimal size are formed is
to deny class certification to classes that are suboptimal. At present,
however, optimal class size is not an explicit consideration when
courts decide whether to certify a class action. In theory, optimal class
size could be a relevant variable in determining whether the superior-

(2) MBg. > MCg.;
(3) MBg. 1; < MC,;; and
(4) EB(G*) - TC(G*) > EB(G) - TC(G) for any G_,, other than G*.
68 See supra note 32; see also In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 167 (2d
Cir. 1987) (noting "the difficulty in fashioning a distribution scheme that does not overcompensate weak claimants and undercompensate strong ones" in class actions).
69 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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ity prong in Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out class actions has been met. 70 For
the most part, however, courts consider other matters-such as the
manageability of the class action and the existence of nonclass aggregation mechanisms-when determining superiority.71 In Rule
23(b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions, there is no hook precisely comparable to superiority on which to hang an optimality analysis. 7 2 Our discussion suggests that, in deciding whether to certify a particular class,
and in deciding which among numerous competing classes to certify, a
court should make optimal class size a relevant consideration.
III.

OPTIMAL CLASS SIZE AND OPT-OUT RIGHTS

Thus far, we have said nothing about opt-out rights. In the situation that we are analyzing-cases in which no class member has an
incentive to sue individually-opt-out rights might seem a moot point,
for no rational class member who stands to gain (or at least not lose)
from class treatment would instead opt for a world in which he or she
gained nothing. We admit that the issue of opt-out rights has more
salience in cases in which at least some class members have viable
individual claims. But even in negative-value instances, the scope of
opt-out rights matters in a range of situations.
70 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (stating that a class action must be "superior to other
available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy").
71 See id. 23(b)(3)(A)-(D) (listing four factors to be used in determining superiority, including manageability); In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, 1018-20 (7th Cir. 2002)
(relying principally on a lack of manageability to reverse a decision granting class certification).
72 FED R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)-(2). Some courts have held that Rule 23(b)(2) requires a finding that the class is sufficiently "cohesive." See In re St. Jude Med., Inc., 425 F.3d 1116, 1121 (8th
Cir. 2005); Barnes v. Am. Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 142-43 (3d Cir. 1998); cf In re Welding
Fume Prods. Liab. Litig., 245 F.R.D. 279, 315, 315 n.189 (N.D. Ohio 2007) (noting that "whether
there is an implicit cohesiveness requirement within Rule 23(b)(2) is not settled within this Circuit" and citing cases on both sides of the issue); New Motor Vehicles Canadian Exp., No. MDL
1532, 2006 WL 623591, at *9-10 (D. Me. 2006) (requiring and finding class cohesiveness for
antitrust claims seeking a classwide injunction). Some courts have also held that Rule 23(b)(2)
contains a finding that the class be manageable. See Shook v. El Paso Cnty., 386 F.3d 963, 973
(10th Cir. 2004) ("Elements of manageability and efficiency are not categorically precluded in
determining whether to certify a [Rule] 23(b)(2) class."); Lowery v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 158
F.3d 742, 758 n.5 (4th Cir. 1998), vacated on other grounds, 527 U.S. 1031, on remand, 206 F.3d
431 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding "that in appropriate circumstances a district court may ... deny
certification if the resulting class action would be unmanageable or cumbersome"). Other courts
disagree. See Forbush v. J.C. Penney Co., 994 F.2d 1101, 1105 (5th Cir. 1993) ("[Q]uestions of
manageability and judicial economy are . . . irrelevant to [Rule] 23(b)(2) class actions."); see also
Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 614-15 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted, 79
U.S.L.W. 3128 (U.S. Dec. 6, 2010) (No. 10-277) (importing a manageability analysis into Rule
23(a) in a massive Rule 23(b)(2) class action); id. at 617 (discussing manageability issues in connection with Rule 23(b)(2)).
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First, some class members might be risk-averse or lack adequate
information, and thus wish to opt out even when the benefits they can
expect from class treatment exceed the costs. 73 Second, it is possible
for a class to contain members who benefit less from class treatment
than the class action benefits from them. 7 4 In most circumstances,
these individuals should be excluded from class membership.75 Because writing a class definition that excludes these members might be
difficult, an alternative solution to achieve exclusion is to give class
members the ability to opt out, on the theory that each member is in
the best position to realize the benefits and losses from class
treatment.
A third reason to consider opt-out rights in negative value cases is
to put pressure on class counsel and the class representative to structure a fair and optimal class. This concern has two aspects. First, until
now, we have considered only the question of optimal class size on the
assumption that a class action yields a given amount of benefit to its
members.76 But it is possible that another competing class action
might yield a higher benefit. For example, perhaps another lawyer is
more skilled or more efficient, so that the class action this other lawyer proposes to maintain yields a higher benefit (in effect, raising the
marginal benefit lines MB or MB 2 in Figures 1-11). Allowing members to opt out of the present class action can put competitive pressure
on class counsel to make sure that the present class action is indeed
the most beneficial for class members.77
73 Cf Debra Lee Bassett, Implied "Consent" to Personal Jurisdiction in Transnational
Class Litigation, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REv. 619, 639-40 (arguing that foreign class action members
should have opt-in rights because there are many factors, such as fear and misunderstandings,
which might dissuade those potential members from taking part in the class action).
74 For this demonstration, see supra text accompanying Figures 6, 9, 11; supra notes 63-65
and accompanying text. One view of constitutionally adequate representation requires that class
members be made no worse off than they would have been had they either chosen to file an
individual suit or instead chosen not to sue, whichever decision yielded the greater expected net
benefit. But not all cases have adopted this principle, so some negative value class actions might
contain members who are affirmatively made worse off by class treatment. See supra note 30.
75 Sometimes, however, it is necessary for these class members to remain in the case. For
this discussion, see supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
76 See supra Part II.
77 We have assumed in the text that the competitive pressure would come from another
class action. Other methods of aggregation are also possible. See supra note 19. Although these
methods are unlikely to be useful in many negative value suits, we can generalize the claim in the
text so that class members should arguably be given the right to opt out whenever any alternative form of aggregation (including an alternative class action) promises to yield a greater net
benefit.
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The second concern is that, even assuming that the present class
action yields the highest net benefit to the class, we can hypothesize a
situation in which all of the benefit of the class action is concentrated
in the hands of the class representative and class counsel, and the class
members receive nothing. Because the class members are not worse
off than they would be otherwise (as they would never have sued individually), the class action does not necessarily offend the adequacy of
representation requirement, even if it offends our sense of equity and
fairness.78 One way to give effect to this sense is to allow class members to opt out of a class when class members perceive that the distribution scheme is unfair, effectively pressuring class counsel and the
class representative to structure the class to achieve a more equitable
distribution of the remedy.
A fourth, and essential, reason to consider opt-out rights, even in
negative value cases, is the Constitution. The Supreme Court has held
that, in class actions seeking monetary relief "wholly or predominately," class members who lack contact with the forum enjoy a right
to opt out of the class. 79
Despite these important concerns, our view is that, if a class is an
optimal size, and if this class action yields greater net social benefits
than other methods of aggregation, no opt-outs should be permitted.
Put differently, a class representative who establishes an optimally
sized class should be allowed to maintain the class action on a
mandatory basis when this class action provides more benefit than
other aggregation mechanisms do. The reason is simple: from an efficiency perspective, such a class action yields the greatest social benefit, and permitting departures from this class decreases that social
benefit. Absent countervailing considerations (such as litigant autonomy, which is very weak in the negative-value context8o), there is no
reason to adopt a nonefficient opt-out rule.
In making this claim, we do not minimize the arguments for an
opt-out right, even in the negative-value context. The first argument-that class members might misperceive the benefits and costsis the least substantial. Giving people the autonomy to make socially
inefficient choices due to their own erroneous perceptions seems justi78 See Tidmarsh, supra note 30, at 1190-94. For an argument that an inequitable concentration of benefits might violate the adequacy of representation requirement, see Woolley, supra
note 30, at 946-47.
79 Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811 n.3 (1985); see also id. at 811-12; supra
note 4.
80 On the nature of litigant autonomy and the effect of class actions on that autonomy, see
Tidmarsh, supra note 30, at 1140-51.
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fiable only on a strong notion of liberty or autonomy. But given that
the autonomy will be exercised in favor of doing nothing (because no
individual who opts out will sue8l), and given that nothing is expected

of the class member in the class action, 82 it seems no great infringement on absent class members to remain in the class when doing so
benefits other class members and (as long as they expect to receive
some positive benefit from the class action) themselves as well.
The second reason to permit an opt-out right-the desire to remove putative class members for whom the costs of litigation are
greater than the benefits they receive-is more powerful. Like many
marginal utility calculations, the formulas for determining optimal
class size require significant member-specific information that is difficult to obtain in the real world, especially at the certification stage.
Therefore, there is appeal in the notion that the class definition should
sweep broadly, put the onus on individual class members to decide if
the class action is worth it, and let the class members for whom the
cost-benefit calculus is negative opt out. In essence, providing an optout right puts the decision about class membership into the hands of
the persons with the best information about whether class membership makes sense. 3
Unfortunately, this notion is unworkable in practice. To begin, it
is not obvious that individual class members have better information
about the benefits of the class action or its ultimate costs. Nor is there
a guarantee that only the "right" class members-those whose costs
exceed benefits-will opt out: those who believe erroneously that they
will receive no benefits from class treatment might also opt out, and
some who should opt out might not. Next, an opt-out right creates the
possibility of strategic behavior, in which some parties who stand to
gain from class treatment nonetheless opt out (or threaten to do so) to
81 It is in theory possible that a person will misperceive both the value of remaining in the
class action (believing that the net benefit will be negative) and the value of an individual suit
(believing that the net benefit will be positive). This person will both opt out and bring suit.
Because such a suit is worthless in fact, there is little social value in allowing it to be brought in a
court system that many already regard as too clogged and, therefore, little reason to honor the
person's right to opt out just to vindicate the autonomy to act based on a doubly erroneous view
of the world.
82 See Shutts, 472 U.S. at 810 ("Unlike a defendant in a normal civil suit, an absent class
action plaintiff is not required to do anything. He may sit back and allow the litigation to run its
course, content in knowing that there are safeguards provided for his protection.").
83 Cf GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF AccIDErrrs: A LEGAL AND ECONoMic ANALYsis 135, 139 (1970) (arguing that one factor to be considered in imposing liability is the cheapest
cost avoider).
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extract rents from members remaining in the class. 84 Moreover, in
some cases, an optimally sized class must include class members
whose costs exceed their benefits;85 extending an opt-out right to these
class members discourages formation of an optimally sized class.
Finally, a court possesses alternatives that make it less necessary
for "losing" class members to remove themselves. The court can apply a rough presumption to determine the optimal class size.86 In addition, a court might require the class representative who requests
class certification to sample the class (especially those whose benefit is
likely to be smallest-in other words, those who approach n in Figures
7-11) and to determine whether significant numbers of class members
are likely to be "losers" (i.e., people whose costs from class treatment
exceed their benefits).87 This information can help the court and class
counsel to construct a class definition that excludes individuals who
possess the characteristics of the "losers" or, when appropriate, to
construct a plan to spread the losses of the "losers" across the "winners."88 Most controversially, a court could allow "losers" to attack
the judgment collaterally. 89
84 See generally Michael A. Perino, Class Action Chaos? The Theory of the Core and an
Analysis of Opt-Out Rights in Mass Tort Class Actions, 46 EMORY L.J. 85, 108-19 (1997) (discussing the ways in which coalitions of class members can disrupt a beneficial class action).
85 See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text. These are the class members between g3
and g4 in Figures 10 and 11.
86 See supra text following note 67.
87 The sampling of class members to determine the characteristics of their claims is not an
uncommon practice. See Smith v. Lowe's Home Ctrs., Inc., 236 F.R.D. 354, 357-58 (S.D. Ohio
2006); In re Airline Ticket Comm'n Antitrust Litig., 918 F. Supp. 283, 288 (D. Minn. 1996). The
"losers" to whom we refer are the class members from g, to n in Figure 6, g2 to n in Figure 9, g3 to
g 4 in Figures 10 and 11, and gs to n in Figure 11.
88 As we have previously described, loss spreading is an efficient strategy only with respect
to class members between g3 to g 4 in Figures 10 and 11. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying
text. For all of the other "losers" mentioned supra note 87, loss spreading is an inefficient solution. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
89 The capacity of disappointed class members to attack a class judgment or settlement
collaterally is a much debated subject. Compare Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249,
261 (2d Cir. 2001) (permitting collateral attack, albeit not in a negative value case), aff'd in part
by an equally divided Court and vacated in part, 539 U.S. 111 (2003), with Samuel Issacharoff &
Richard A. Nagareda, Class Settlements Under Attack, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1649, 1658-59 (2008)
(generally arguing against collateral attack when the court in the first case determines that the
class's representation was adequate). The Principles also take a narrow view of collateral attacks. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 3.14 (2010). In our judgment,
should collateral attacks be permitted, the inquiry should be limited to considering whether the
expected (or ex ante) benefits were less than expected (or ex ante) costs at the time of certification and (if applicable) settlement. We would not consider the ex post results of the class action,
at least in the absence of strategic behavior by class counsel or the class representative to throw
the costs onto some class members.
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The third reason to permit an opt-out right-the need to put
competitive pressure on class counsel to structure the most beneficial
aggregation scheme and to fairly distribute benefits among class members-is also powerful. In our judgment, however, permitting an optout right is a poor way to address these concerns. As for ensuring that
aggregation occurs in the way most beneficial to society, the superiority requirement in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions gives the courts room to
reject the certification of a class action that delivers less benefit than
another class action or another aggregation device.9 Superiority is
not an element of Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions, at least in a
formal sense, although some courts have undertaken comparable inquiries. 91 An analysis of the superiority of a particular class action to
other aggregation devices-an analysis that must consider the optimal
size of the class-is a better way to ensure optimal aggregation than
the indirect method of relying on opt-outs. Indeed, given the historically low rate of opt-outs92 and the negative-value nature of the
claims, an opt-out right is unlikely to have a substantial deterrent effect on the behavior of class counsel and class representatives who fail
to achieve optimal aggregation. Therefore, permitting an opt-out
right seems more likely to foster illegitimate rent extraction than to
put legitimate pressure on class representatives and class counsel to
structure an optimal aggregation scheme.
Likewise, allowing class members to opt out as a means of
preventing class counsel and class representatives from unfairly distributing benefits within the class is also a fitful and indirect approach
to a problem for which a direct and readily available method is more
effective. Unfair distributions are most likely to arise in settlements,
especially settlements of monetary claims. 93 But judges must approve
all class action settlements, and to do so they must find that the settlement is "fair, reasonable, and adequate." 9 4 Judicial disapproval of unfair settlements is by far a better deterrent for preventing inequitable
distributions than allowing an opt-out right, especially in negativevalue cases. Opting out is a symbolic protest unless enough class
members opt out that a new class action can then commence-a most
unlikely scenario.
90 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
91 See supra note 72.
See supra note 8.
See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 855-56 (1999) (rejecting a class action
settlement in part because of the unfairness of the distribution).
92
93

94

FED.

R.

div. P.

23(e)(2).
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The final argument for a right to opt out is the constitutional one.
Our analysis has focused on the economics of optimal class action aggregation and has arrived at the unsurprising conclusion that class
members should not be allowed to opt out when doing so results in a
class action that is less efficient due to its suboptimal size. This analysis casts a new light on the "Shutts problem": in other words, on the
precise scope of the due process right of class members without forum
contacts to opt out of class actions "wholly or predominately" seeking
damages.95 The Due Process Clause is susceptible to an economic interpretation, in which the government can deprive individuals of their
adversarial rights when the benefits of a nonadversarial process outweigh the risks of an erroneous deprivation. 96 By analogy, a court
should be able to deprive a class member of a right to pursue an individual remedy that is worth nothing when the social benefits are
greater. Indeed, Shutts did not necessarily involve a class of optimal
size-the Kansas state courts in Shutts never conducted such an analysis, 97 nor did the Supreme Court 9 8 -So Shutts had no occasion to decide whether an opt-out right exists in an optimally sized class.
We recognize that this argument is perhaps too clever by half.
The personal jurisdiction branch of the Due Process Clause, on which
Shutts based its holding,99 has always proven somewhat impervious to
arguments grounded in efficiency. 00 By positing a class action that
yields the greatest social benefit, however, we put Shutts in its least
appealing light: why should a class member who gains nothing by opting out be allowed to do so and thereby harm the interests of the class
as a whole?
IV.

OPTIMAL CLASS SIZE AND INDIVISIBLE REMEDIES

There is much to like in the Principles' functional approach to
analyzing opt-out rights. Similarly, there is much to be intrigued
about in the Principles' distinction between indivisible remedies, for
which no opt-out right needs to be afforded, and divisible remedies,
95 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
96 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
97 See Shutts v. Phillips Petrol. Co., 679 P.2d 1159 (Kan. 1984).
98 See Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
99 See id. at 807.
100 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,291-92, 297 (1980) (creating a two-prong personal jurisdiction test, one dependent on whether a defendant "purposefully
avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State" and one based in
notions of economy and convenience).
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for which an opt-out right is permissible.101 The Principles' basic intuition-that class actions seeking classwide rather than individualized
relief should be mandatory in nature-is consistent with our presumption favoring a mandatory class action composed of the entire class
when no tailoring of the remedy to individual circumstances is
required.
Beyond these common intuitions, however, our disagreements
with the Principles' approach emerge. The Principles do not consider
the idea of optimal class size. As a result, the most evident divergence
between our approach and the Principles' approach surfaces immediately: We believe that opt-out rights are unnecessary and counterproductive when a negative value class is optimally sized.
Furthermore, because we also believe that a court should certify only
classes of optimal size, we reject the notion that a class action rule
should permit an opt-out right.
Our analysis also suggests other difficulties with the Principles'
approach to mandatory class actions. To begin, the "sameness" of the
remedy-the idea on which the Principles build their indivisibility
analysislO2-is not a talisman. It is possible to understand "sameness"
in two different ways. In one sense, the "same" remedy means a remedy of identical benefit to each class member. 0 3 In another sense, the
"same" remedy means a remedy that gives every class member the
same legal right, even though different class members value that right
differently.'0 The Principles seem to conceive of sameness in the latter sense.1 0 5 But it is important to keep the two meanings separate
from each other, at least if we care about the efficient resolution of
mass disputes. As we have shown, the analysis of the two situations is
similar, but the latter situation raises analytical difficulties in determining the most efficient class action-difficulties to which the Principles did not attend.
Moreover, our analysis shows that, when the remedy for all class
members is the "same," it is not always appropriate to create a
mandatory class composed of all the injured victims. While we agree
with the Principles that class actions should be mandatory, we have
shown that a mandatory class composed of all members can be inefficient. Rather, in some circumstances, a mandatory class of smaller
101 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LrIG.
102 Id. § 2.04(b).
103

See supra Part II.A.

104 See supra Part II.B.
105

See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.

§ 2.04 (2010).
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size is optimal; a mandatory class composed of all class members,
which the Principles contemplate, is inefficient. On the flip side, we
have also shown that, even when a remedy is not the same, there are
efficiency gains to be had from mandatory treatment of optimally
sized classes.
Simply put, the sameness, or indivisibility, of the remedy has only
a glancing relationship to the efficient resolution of mass negativevalue claims. True, there is a general correspondence between the individualization of remedies and a class size smaller than the entire
class of injured plaintiffs-an intuition that our analysis shares with
the Principles. In cashing out that intuition, however, the Principles
fail to attend to the demands of efficiency. The indivisibility approach
authorizes mandatory treatment of some classes that are inefficiently
large and also authorizes class members to opt out of classes that are
operating at their most efficient size. Stating principles for "promoting the efficient use of litigation resources" was one of the main goals
of the Principles.106 Our analysis is more consonant with this functional orientation than the Principles'indivisibility approach-an approach that is less successful in escaping the gravitational pull of
history than it claims.
CONCLUSION

Our analysis demonstrates that optimal class size should be a critical variable in assessing the certification of classes, that determining
optimal class size requires an examination of the relationship between
marginal benefits and marginal costs for class members, and that an
optimally sized class should contain no opt-out right. At present, our
analysis is limited to negative value suits. In this context, however, the
Principles bear a heavier burden than they have thus far carried to
explain why their inefficient indivisibility approach should be preferred as a functional matter.

106 See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAw oF AGGREGATE LrG. § 1.03(a) (2010). The other goals
were "enforcing substantive rights and responsibilities," id. § 1.03(b), "facilitating binding resolutions of civil disputes," id. § 1.03(c), and "facilitating accurate and just resolutions of civil disputes by trial and settlement," id. § 1.03(d). In addition to better fulfilling the goal of efficient
adjudication, our approach, which makes all optimally sized class actions mandatory, better fulfills the goals in sections 1.03(b) and (c), and fares no worse in fulfilling the goal in section
1.03(d).

